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COMMENTS
DERIVATIVE IMMUNITY UNDER SECTION 1983:
CONSPIRACIES BETWEEN IMMUNE
JUDICIAL OFFICIALS AND
PRIVATE PERSONS
THE NATURE AND BACKGROUND OF SECTION

1983

Section 1983 was enacted by Congress as part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871.' Together with its jurisdictional counterpart, 2 section 1983 provides a party with a cause of action in the
3
federal courts for an alleged deprivation of a federal right.
However, in order to institute a suit under section 1983, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the asserted violation was performed under color of state law.4 This initial requirement is defined as the equivalent of state action under the fourteenth
amendment. 5 The plaintiff must further allege that the state action in question deprived him of a right, privilege or immunity
1. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (recent codification in 42

U.S.C. § 1983 (1976)).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person:... (3) To redress
the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the
Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing
for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States; ....

3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
4. E.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) ("It is State action
...that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the
subject matter of the amendment."); Robinson v. Bergstrom, 579 F.2d 401
(7th Cir. 1978) (same principle).
5. E.g., United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966) ("under color of state
law" means state action as it has been interpreted under the fourteenth
amendment); see Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (same
principle); Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1979) (en banc)
(same principle); Green v. Dumke, 480 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1973) (same principle).
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secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 6
Hence, not all unlawful deprivations of liberty are protected
under section 1983; "[tJ he Civil Rights Act was not intended to
'7
create a body of general federal tort law."
The state action requirement imposed by section 1983 does
not require the plaintiff to join a public official as a party defendant. 8 It is sufficient if the act in question, although performed by
a private individual, is a function exclusively reserved to the
sovereign. 9 In recent years, however, the Court has been hesitant to find state action on the "sovereign function" theory.' 0 As
a result, the majority of section 1983 cases predicate state action
on the conduct of persons acting under color of state law. 1 The
conduct of the actor need not be legal or otherwise authorized
2
by the state.'
For purposes of the state action requirement, not all party
defendants must be state actors. Private persons may be sued
under section 1983 where it is alleged that they have conspired
with state officials in the prohibited action.13 Thus, "tilt is
6. E.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (involving § 242, the
criminal counterpart to § 1983); Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d 261 (7th Cir.
1979) (en banc) (constitutional rights, and rights created under federal law,
are protected by § 1983); Fine v. New York, 529 F.2d 70 (2nd Cir. 1975) (same
principle); Baer v. Baer, 450 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (same principle).
7. Lessman v. McCormick, 591 F.2d 605, 609 (10th Cir. 1979).

8. In recent years, state action has been frequently alleged on the
grounds that a public official has conspired with private persons to deprive
the plaintiff of a federal right. See note 13 and accompanying text infra.
9. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (no state action on the
"sovereign function" theory since settling disputes over property is not a
function exclusively reserved to the states); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (dictum) (state action is present where a private
entity exercises powers traditionally reserved to the states); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (upholding the public function theory with respect
to company owned towns).
10. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (adoption of the
Uniform Commercial Code, which allows private individuals to settle property disputes, is not state action).
11. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (judges act under color of
law); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966) (law enforcement officials
act under state law); Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951) (private
detective, issued a special police officer's card by the city, held to act under
color of law); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (election officials
conducting a primary election to nominate a party candidate act under state
law); Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1975) (prosecutors and public
defenders act under color of law).
12. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (where a defendant possesses
power by virtue of state law, misuse of that power is action taken under
color of state law); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945) ("It is
clear that under color of law means under pretense of law ....
Acts of
officers who undertake to perform their official duties are included whether
they hew to the line of their authority or overstep it.").
13. E.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (private persons
involved in a conspiracy with public officials are acting under color of law
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enough that [the private person] is a willful participant with the
State or its agents. '14 However, where a plaintiff alleges a section 1983 cause of action based on a prohibited conspiracy 15 between state actors and private persons, the question of
immunity frequently arises. This comment will explore the inherent problems in pleading and maintaining a section 1983 suit
where private persons have allegedly conspired with immune
judicial officials.
JudicialImmunity
16
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Shelley v. Kraemer,
the acts of judicial officers have been regarded as "action[s] of
17
the State within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment."
It would seem to follow from this proposition that joining a
judge as a party defendant would provide the requisite state action under section 1983.18 Traditionally, however, judges have
been considered absolutely immune from civil liability for acts
performed in the course of their official duties. 19 A similar immunity has been applied to prosecutors 20 and legislators. 21 This

and

are subject to liability under § 1983); Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d 261
(7th Cir. 1979) (en banc) (same principle); Colaizzi v. Walker, 542 F.2d 969
(7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 960 (1977) (same principle); Potenza v.
Schoessling, 541 F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1976) (same principle).
14. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966) (cause of action stated
under § 1983 where private persons conspired with law enforcement officials).
15. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 280 (5th ed. 1979) defines conspiracy as:
A combination or confederacy between two or more persons formed for
the purpose of committing, by their joint efforts, some unlawful or criminal act, or some act which is lawful in itself, but becomes unlawful
when done by the concerted action of the conspirators, or for the purpose of using criminal or unlawful means to the commission of an act
not in itself unlawful.
16. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
17. Id. at 14; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (the judicial act
of the state court is the act of the state).
18. In addition to establishing the state action requirement, it is necessary that the defendant has allegedly deprived the plaintiff of a federal
right, privilege or immunity. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
19. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (judges may not be subjected to a
civil suit for damages for judicial acts performed); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 335 (1872) (same principle); Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co.,
604 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1979) (en bane), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943 (1980) (same
principle); Dotlich v. Kane, 497 F.2d 390 (8th Cir. 1974) (same principle);
Byrne v. Kysar, 347 F.2d 734 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 913 (1966)
(same principle). But cf.O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (judges are
not immune from criminal liability); Doe v. County of Lake, Indiana, 399 F.
Supp. 553 (N.D. Ind. 1975) (judges are not necessarily immune from suits
brought by plaintiffs requesting equitable relief).
20. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecutors enjoy an immunity from civil suits where the act in question was performed during the
course of an official duty).
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common law immunity extends to actions brought under the
Civil Rights Act. 22 In considering this common law immunity,
the Supreme Court reasoned that if Congress wished to abolish
the common law immunities, it would have specifically indicated
23
that intent.
The judicial immunity doctrine bars civil suits against
judges 24 even where the judicial act was erroneous or malicious. 2 5 Only if the judge acted in a "clear absence of all jurisdiction" is he amenable to suit.26 The theory behind this rather
broad immunity is its purported indispensability to the "free
and fearless administration of justice. '27 The independence of
the judiciary must be preserved so that judges may decide the
merits of claims without fear of personal liability. 28 Similarly,
the maliciousness of the act is irrelevant; 29 to hold otherwise
would precipitate numerous claims charging the judge with cor21. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (legislators are immune
from civil liability).
22. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (judges are immune from civil
liability for judicial acts performed during a state court proceeding, and
challenged in the federal court in a civil rights action); Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1979) (en banc) (same principle); Haldane v. Chagnon, 345 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1965) (same principle).
23. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
24. Judicial immunity also extends to lower judicial officers as well. See
Kermit Constr. Corp. v. Banco Credito y Ahorro Ponceno, 547 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1976) (court appointed receivors); Haldane v. Chagnon, 345 F.2d 601 (9th
Cir. 1965) (bailiffs); cf.Cross v. Board of Supervisors of San Mateo County,
326 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (deputies of the district attorney benefit
from prosecutorial immunity).
25. E.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (judicial immunity applies
although the judge is accused of acting corruptly or maliciously).
26. E.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (dictum); Sparks v.
Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 943 (1980). But cf.Jacobson v. Schaefer, 441 F.2d 127 (7th Cir. 1971)
(judicial acts performed in "excess of jurisdiction" are protected by the immunity); Wade v. Bethesda Hosp., 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971) (dictum) (same principle).
27. Haldane v. Chagnon, 345 F.2d 601, 603 (9th Cir. 1965).
28. For it is a general principle of the highest importance to the
proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the
authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions,
without apprehension of personal consequences to himself. Liability to
answer to everyone who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of
the judge, would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom,
and would destroy that independence without which no judiciary can
be either respectable or useful.
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1872).
29. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) ("It is a judge's duty to decide
all cases within his jurisdiction .... [H]e should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption. Imposing such a burden on judges would contribute not to principled
and fearless decision-making but to intimidation.").
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rupt motives. 30 For these policy reasons, it is clear that a judge
may not be sued directly under section 1983. Any claim against
31
a judge will be dismissed by reason of the immunity defense.
What is unclear is the extent of this immunity, a particularly relevant issue in cases alleging a prohibited conspiracy between
judges and private persons.
THE DOCTRINE OF DERIVATIVE IMMUNITY

As recently confirmed in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 32 a
conspiracy between state actors and private persons subjects
even the private persons to liability under section 1983. 33 However, when the sole state actor sued as a party defendant i himself immune from suit, the circuits are in conflict as to the effect
of that immunity on the section 1983 cause of action. In determining the effect of judicial immunity, two options are available
to the courts. The entire action can be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 34 or because the plaintiff failed to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. 35 The theory behind
this is that a private person cannot be held liable since he is not
conspiring with persons "acting under color of law against
whom a valid claim can be stated." 36 This is the principle of
derivative 3 7 immunity; there is a lack of state action by virtue of
the judge's immunity and, therefore, the private person is vicari38
ously immune from suit.
The second option available to the courts is to allow the
plaintiff to maintain a section 1983 action although the conspirators are immune judges and private persons. Where the section
1983 suit is allowed, immunity is treated as an affirmative defense 39 rather than a jurisdictional issue. 4° Thus, the claim
30. See Doe v. County of Lake, Indiana, 399 F. Supp. 553 (N.D. Ind. 1975)
(if judges were not immune for acts committed in bad faith, they would be
subject to suits instituted by numerous unsatisfied litigants).
31. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
32. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
33. See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
36. Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203, 205 (3d Cir. 1975) (emphasis added).
37.

BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 399 (5th ed. 1979) defines derivative as:

"Coming from another; taken from something preceding; secondary. That
which has not its origin in itself, but owes its existence to something foregoing. Anything obtained or deduced from another."
38. E.g., Sykes v. California, 497 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1974) (no state action
where private persons conspire with immune officials since official immunity extends to the private persons); Bergman v. Stein, 404 F. Supp. 287
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (same principle).
39. See Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1979)
(en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943 (1980) (judicial immunity is a defense
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against the immune official will be dismissed after the court has
noted probable jurisdiction, and the case will proceed as against
41
the private persons.
Applying Derivative Immunity: Conflicting Decisions
Although early judicial decisions alluded to the possibility
of derivative immunity, 42 the doctrine of derivative immunity
was not recognized until Haldane v. Chagnon.43 In Haldane,
the presiding judge in a divorce proceeding signed an order, on
petition by the attorneys, requiring the defendant to submit to a
mental health examination. The defendant subsequently filed a
pro se complaint, alleging that the judge, the attorneys, and the
bailiff conspired to deprive him of his civil rights." The court
45
noted that since the judge and bailiff were immune from suit,
no claim could be stated against the attorneys. The attorneys
were not state officers and did not conspire with a state officer
against whom a valid claim could be stated. "It follows that [the
attorneys] could not commit the alleged wrongful acts 'under
47
color of state law' "46 and could not be subject to liability.
Since the Haldane decision, the doctrine of derivative im48
munity has been consistently adhered to in the Ninth Circuit,
for the judge which may preclude recovery against him, but does not preclude an initial finding of state action).
40. Robinson v. Bergstrom, 579 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1978) (immunity does
not preclude a finding of subject matter jurisdiction; it is a defense and not a
jurisdictional issue in a civil rights action).
41. It should be noted that in those jurisdictions where derivative immunity is not recognized, plaintiffs can partially void the state action mandate of § 1983. When the immune judge is dismissed from the suit, the case
can proceed against the private defendants. Hence, plaintiffs can effectively
do indirectly what they canot do directly: institute a cause of action in the
federal courts, under § 1983, against private persons.
42. See, e.g., Bottone v. Lindsley, 170 F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 944 (1949) (questioning whether state action was present
where the plaintiff sued private defendants and the judge involved in a suit
that plaintiff unsuccessfully litigated in the state courts).
43. 345 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1965).
44. Haldane v. Changnon, 345 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1965). Apparently, the
bailiff was joined in the suit merely because he happened to be present and
associated with the state court proceeding.
45. Id. The judicial immunity extends to the bailiff since he is a lower
judicial official.
46. Id. at 604-05.
47. Id. The theory and impact of derivative immunity is clearly expressed in the Haldane decision. The attorneys could not be subjected to
liability merely because the state actor with whom they conspired was immune from suit. The immunity of the state actor was thought to defeat the
state action.
48. Sykes v. California, 497 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1974) (private persons cannot be held liable under § 1983 for conspiring with a state official who is
immune from suit); Rankin v. Howard, 457 F. Supp. 70 (D. Ariz. 1978) (same
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although the cases fail to offer any justification for the doctrine. 49 The derivative immunity principle is similarly applied
in the Third,50 Fourth,5 1 Sixth, 52 and Tenth Circuits. 53 While extending official immunity to private persons also appears to be
the established rule in the Second Circuit, that jurisdiction has
54
rendered conflicting opinions.
In contrast to these circuits, a minority of jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia,5 5 do not adhere to the derivative immunity principle. 56 For example, in Sparks v. Duval
principle); Baer v. Baer, 450 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (same principle);
Shakespeare v. Wilson, 40 F.R.D. 500 (S.D. Cal. 1966) (same principle). But
cf. Briley v. California, 564 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1977) (indicating that the derivative immunity issue is an open question and recognition of the doctrine in
Haldane was only dictum).
49. The decisions rendered in the Ninth Circuit seem to accept the validity of derivative immunity without questioning it. No theories or policies
are offered to justify the position that suits against private persons should
be dismissed when the state actor they conspired with happens to be immune from suit. See notes 44 and 48 supra.
50. Hazo v. Geltz, 537 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1976) (immunity of the state actor
precludes § 1983 suits against private conspirators as well); Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1975) (same principle); Trivett v. Bank of Delaware, 421 F. Supp. 827 (D. Del. 1976) (same principle); Meyer v. Curran, 397
F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (same principle).
51. Dennis v. Hein, 413 F. Supp. 1137 (D.S.C. 1976) (suit brought by
lessee against lessor and immune magistrate was dismissed for failure to
state claim upon which relief could be granted).
52. Kurz v. Michigan, 548 F.2d 172 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
972 (1977) (private persons cannot be held liable for conspiring with immune officials).
53. Weaver v. Haworth, 410 F. Supp. 1032 (E.D. Okla. 1975) (suit alleging
a conspiracy between a judge and private persons dismissed; due to judicial
immunity, a judge cannot act under color of state law).
54. Russell v. Mamaroneck, 440 F. Supp. 607, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
("[P]rivate defendants cannot act under color of state law on the basis of
[a] conspiracy. . . if the. . . officials with whom they are alleged to act in
concert are themselves immune from liability."); Bergman v. Stein, 404 F.
Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (same principle); Jemzura v. Belden, 281 F. Supp.
200 (N.D.N.Y. 1968) (same principle by implication). But cf. Martin Hodas,
East Coast Cinematics, Inc. v. Lindsay, 431 F. Supp. 637 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(grant of immunity to defendants, prosecuting attorneys, does not preclude
the recovery of damages from the private persons who are not immune from
suit).
55. Mandelkorn v. Patrick, 359 F. Supp. 692 (D.D.C. 1973) (private party
acts under color of state law when he conspires with a state official, regardless of any immunity pertaining to the state official).
56. Kermit Constr. Corp. v. Banco Credit y Ahorro Ponceno, 547 F.2d 1
(1st Cir. 1976). In Kermit, the First Circuit abandoned the doctrine of derivative immunity. The plaintiff had brought a civil rights action against a
bank, a construction company, and a court appointed receiver. The plaintiff
alleged that the defendants conspired to place the corporation in receivership and thus avoid paying a corporate debt. The court, in reversing the
trial court, held that the complaint stated a § 1983 cause of action. Although
the receiver was immune from suit, the court determined that the bank and
construction company could not seek the shelter of this immunity. The conspiracy itself was action taken under color of state law; the fact the receiver
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County Ranch Co.,57 the Fifth Circuit abandoned the rule of deoverruled a long line of
rivative immunity. The Sparks decision
58
precedent upholding the immunity.
In Sparks, the plaintiffs filed suit under section 1983 alleging
that a judge conspired with private persons to deprive the plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. 59 Since the judge was immune
from suit, the appellate court held that the remaining defendants did not conspire with anyone against whom a valid section
1983 claim could be stated. 60 The complaint was dismissed, but
a rehearing en bane was granted.
In the en banc rehearing, 61 the panel refused to extend a
derivative immunity to private persons who conspire with immune judges. 62 "[C Ionspirators act under color of law and can
be sued for damages in a section 1983 action when they involve a
judge in their plot, regardless of whether the judge can be
brought to justice for his part in the scheme." 63 In reaching the
conclusion that private defendants can be held liable although
they conspire with an immune judge, the Sparks court distinguished between state action and remedies. The presence of the
judge in the suit established the requisite state action; the
judge's immunity merely precluded obtaining damages against
him.

64

was himself immune from suit was irrelevant. This holding has subsequently been upheld in First Circuit decisions. See Downs v. Sawtelle, 574
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978) (immunity of the state
official has no bearing on the state action); Slotnick v. Staviskey, 560 F.2d 31
(1st Cir. 1977) (private parties who conspire with immune officials are subject to liability under § 1983).
57. 604 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1979) (en bane), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943
(1980).
58. See Perez v. Borchers, 567 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1978) (no valid claim can
be stated against private persons who conspire with immune state officials);
Hill v. McClellan, 490 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1974) (same principle); Guedry v.
Ford, 431 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1970) (same principle); Hagopian v. Consolidated Equities Corp., 397 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (same principle).
59. Sparks initially began as a dispute over the use of certain properties. The plaintiffs operated oil and gas wells on land adjacent to the defendant's corporation. The defendant filed suit to enjoin the oil production
on the grounds it was polluting his property. The trial judge granted a temporary injunction. The plaintiffs subsequently filed suit, under § 1983,
against the judge and certain private defendants, alleging they conspired to
deprive the plaintiffs of their oil production. The plaintiffs alleged that the
true motivation behind the request and issuance of the injunction was to
halt the oil production and cause the plaintiffs lease to terminate under a
contract nonproduction clause. The judge allegedly received a bribe for issuing the injunction.
60. Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 588 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1979).
61. Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1979) (en
bane), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943 (1980).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 983.
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Whether a judge's immunity precludes a finding of state action or simply bars the plaintiff from obtaining relief against the
judge is a question the Seventh Circuit has frequently confronted. Because the majority of cases have been dismissed on
the pleadings, 65 the current position of the Seventh Circuit with
respect to derivative immunity is difficult to ascertain. Early decisions seemed to indicate that the judge's immunity defeats the
state action requirement. 66 Recent cases, however, imply a willingness to abandon the derivative immunity doctrine, and recognize state action despite the judge's immunity. 67 If the
derivative immunity principle is abandoned, judicial immunity
will have no effect on state action, although the plaintiff will be
68
precluded from pursuing a remedy against the judge.
Whether or not state action and remedies are viewed as distinct issues is the decisive factor in determining the application
of derivative immunity.6 9 Those jurisdictions which apply derivative immunity believe state action is absent where the state actor is immune from suit, since no remedy is available against
him. 70 Those jurisdictions which consider state action and remedies as separate issues have no need to apply the derivative
64. Id. The Sparks court treated judicial immunity as a defense rather
than a jurisdictional issue.
65. See generally cases cited in note 140 infra.
66. Hansen v. Ahlgrimm, 520 F.2d 768 (7th Cir. 1975) (allegations of a
conspiracy between public officials and private persons are not sufficient to
establish liability under § 1983) (dictum); French v. Corrigan, 432 F.2d 1211
(7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 915 (1971) (dictum) (same principle);
see Brown v. Dunne, 409 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1969) (recognizing the rule of
derivative immunity by implication).
67. Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1979) (en banc)
(Fairchild, C.J., concurring) (implying private persons can be held liable for
conspiring with an immune judge where the pleadings of the conspiracy are
sufficiently specific); see Grow v. Fisher, 523 F.2d 875, 878 (7th Cir. 1975)
("[W] e find somewhat disturbing the lack of any rationale for a rule which
would appear to carry over governmental immunity to private individuals.
The trend of recent judicial decisions has been in the direction of limiting
the scope of immunity rather than enlarging it.").
68. Where the derivative immunity principle is not adhered to, the
plaintiff is still precluded from obtaining a remedy against the judge. However, the private defendants who conspired with the judge will be subject to
liability under a § 1983 suit.
69. See Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1979)
(en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943 (1980) (derivative immunity not applied
since the unavailability of a remedy against the judge is unrelated to the
question of whether state action is present); Kurz v. Michigan, 548 F.2d 172
(6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 972 (1977) (where there is no remedy
available against a state official, private persons cannot be liable for conspiring with the state official because there is no state action).
70. E.g., Russell v. Mamaroneck, 440 F. Supp. 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (private defendants cannot act under color of law if they conspire with an official who is immune from liability).
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immunity fiction. 7 1 State action is present when a state actor is
involved in a prohibited conspiracy. The immunity of the state
actor is a defense which merely bars a civil judgment against the
state actor. 72 Whichever view a circuit adopts largely depends
on public policy considerations.
Public Policy Considerations
Policy considerations underlie the divergent views on the issue of derivative immunity. In determining whether and to
what extent an immunity should be granted, the courts focus on
two elements: (1) the existence of an immunity accorded at
common law, and (2) the public policy considerations supporting that immunity. 73 With respect to the judiciary, both elements support the grant of an immunity. Judges typically
enjoyed an absolute immunity at common law 74 and the immunity is thought to be necessary to the proper and independent
administration of justice. 75 A judge cannot effectively exercise
his discretion in deciding civil and criminal cases where there is
76
always present the threat that he may be subject to liability.
While these considerations support the grant of a judicial
immunity, allowing private persons to vicariously benefit from
that immunity poses a more difficult problem. Private persons
enjoyed no immunity at common law nor are they "confronted
with the pressures of office, the ... decision making or the constant threat of liability. '77 On the contrary, it is axiomatic that
individuals should be held liable "for the natural consequences
71. Derivative immunity appears to be a legal fiction which is employed
to justify dismissal of a § 1983 suit. Private persons are not really immune
from being sued. However, if the court wants to preclude suits involving
immune officials, the only way it can do so is to extend that immunity to the
private persons, through a fiction of "vicarious" immunity.
72. Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1979) (en
banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943 (1980); see Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1
(1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978) (state action is present where
private persons conspire with state officials, although the officials are not
subject to liability); Kermit Constr. Corp. v. Banco Credito y Ahorro Pon-

ceno, 547 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976) (although the immunity of a court appointed
receivor precluded a damage remedy against him, joining the receivor as a
party defendant provided the requisite state action).
73. Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d 261, 273 (7th Cir. 1979) (en banc).

74. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
75. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872) (without the ability to
operate independently, the judiciary would cease to be a respectable and
useful institution).

76. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (subjecting judges to liability
would lead to unprincipled decision-making and intimidation).
77. Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
910 (1978).
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of their act."'7 8 The Supreme Court has applied this maxim to
section 198379 which is especially appropriate considering that
even official immunities only protect the office holder during the
performance of official duties. 80 Thus, the policy considerations
supporting judicial immunity are not applicable to private persons.
More important, it is not accurate to assume that the immunity of the state actor involved somehow destroys the requisite
state action. The official need not even be joined in the suit to
fulfill the state action requirement; 81 therefore, his immunity or
lack thereof should be even less significant. As long as one acting under color of state law is involved in the conspiracy, state
action is provided. 82 The absence of a remedy against the immune state official should not eliminate an action against the
private persons nor should it lessen their responsibility for their
acts.83 The courts have consistently held, in cases which were
not brought under the Civil Rights Act, that the immunity of one
or more conspirators does not preclude conviction of the remaining conspirators. 84 In civil rights actions where constitutional rights are at issue, it is questionable whether the courts
should deviate from the rule allowing recovery against the nonimmune conspirators.
78. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).
79. Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910
(1978) (the notion that individuals should be responsible for their own acts
applies to civil rights actions).
80. E.g., Shore v. Howard, 414 F. Supp. 379, 385 (N.D. Texas 1976) ("Common law immunities extend only so far as the interests of the common good
demand protection for the holder of the office from liability for carrying out
his official functions. [JIudicial immunity is restricted to ... protecting judicial freedom in the process of deciding civil and criminal cases.").
81. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (as long as a person
performed an act under color of law, state action is present; the state actor
need not be joined as a party defendant).
82. E.g., Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1979)
(en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943 (1980) (state action is established
through the conduct of a person acting under color of law).
83. Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
910 (1978) ("The ultimate destiny of the private party can in no way be said
to depend on the status of the official with whom he conspired or upon the
defenses available to that official.").
84. Fransworth v. Zerbst, 98 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1938) (although Japanese
officials could not be sued because of diplomatic immunity, the private persons with whom they conspired were held liable); Ewald v. Lane, 104 F.2d
222 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (where interspousal immunity barred the plaintiffs suit
against her husband, the husband's co-defendants were still held liable);
United States v. Crum, 404 F. Supp. 1161 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (an individual can
be held liable for his part in a conspiracy although his co-conspirators are
immune from prosecution); see generally 91 A.L.R.2d 700, 722-23 (1963) (discussing the effect of a conspirator's immunity on the liability of the co-conspirators).
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It should be noted that there are policy considerations
which favor extending a derivative immunity to private persons
who conspire with public officials. Perhaps the best reason for
extending the immunity is the discouragement of frivolous civil
rights actions. 85 If private persons can be held liable for their
part in the conspiracy, unsatisfied litigants would be induced "to
sue everyone in convenient range," 86 naming the judge who
ruled against them as a defendant in order to allege the requisite state action. The threat of frivolous civil rights actions is
apparent. An increasing number of cases are brought by pro se
litigants who lost in the state courts and request enormous dam87
ages in the federal courts.
Related to the consideration of discouraging frivolous
claims is the fear that abandoning derivative immunity would
alter the relationship between the federal and state courts.88
"[A]nyone dissatisfied with the results of the litigation in the
state court can allege a 'conspiracy' sufficient to obtain federal
court review of his claim." 89 The result would be the broadening
of the provisions of section 1983 in an unprecedented and unintended manner. 90 The federal courts were never intended to operate as a reviewing board for every state court decision. 91
A further consideration favoring derivative immunity is the
fear the private persons would otherwise hesitate to report
crimes and testify as witnesses. 92 This fear, however, is counter85. E.g., Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1979) (en banc)
(Sprecher, J. concurring) (the courts want to avoid entertaining frivolous
civil rights claims).
86. Shakespeare v. Wilson, 40 F.R.D. 500, 502 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
87. Slotnick v. Staviskey, 560 F.2d 31 (1st Cir. 1977) (plaintiff filed a pro
se complaint); Hill v. McClellan, 490 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1974) (pro se complaint filed by a state prisoner); Kamster v. Zaslawsky, 355 F.2d 526 (7th
Cir. 1966) (plaintiff requested $1,000,000 in compensatory damages and
$10,000,000 in punitive damages); Lowery v. Hauk, 422 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal.
1976) (plaintiff requested damages in excess of $1,000,000 for being removed
from a courtroom); Stambler v. Dillon, 302 F. Supp. 1250 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (unsuccessful litigants in three actions brought in the state courts filed a civil
rights suit in the federal court requesting $500,000 in damages).
88. Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1979) (en
bane), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943 (1980) (dissenting opinion) (in the absence
of derivative immunity, the federal courts would be hearing no claims
which are properly within the jurisdiction of the state courts).
89. Id. at 988.
90. See Dennis v. Hein, 413 F. Supp. 1137, 1141 (D.S.C. 1976) ("To allow
the courts to entertain actions based on such allegations as this of conspiracy between private citizens and judicial officers would subject every complainant in every case to potential liability and an alarming possibility of
suit under the ever-broadening provisions of § 1983.").
91. French v. Corrigan, 432 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1970) (federal courts are
not intended to be arbiters of state court decisions).
92. Dennis v. Hein, 413 F. Supp. 1137 (D.S.C. 1976) (private persons, in
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balanced by the fact that private persons' involvement in crimes
would go unremedied under the derivative immunity principle.
While private persons would be less hesitant to report crimes
where derivative immunity is recognized, they would also be
less hesitant to engage in crimes.
Finally, it is suggested that if private persons can be liable
for their participation in a conspiracy, the judge may be required to submit to discovery and appear as a witness. 9 3 Requiring the judge to appear at the trial would unduly hamper the
judicial process. 94 Furthermore, the plaintiff would have an opportunity to do indirectly what he cannot do directly: involve
the judge in litigation and proceed against only private persons
95
under section 1983.
It has been proposed that derivative immunity should only
be enjoyed by those private persons who acted in subjective and
objective good faith. 96 However, this approach would still involve the judge in litigation. 97 If the private person acted in bad
faith, he could still be sued under section 1983 in federal court.
Section 1983 does not seem to contemplate the purity of the private person's motives. 98 Moreover, the argument that derivative immunity depends on the private person's motives
presupposes that the presence of the immune judge provides
the state action factor. The theory of derivative immunity is that
since the judge is immune from suit, there is no state action
present. 9 9 Since it is questionable whether the status of the
the absence of derivative immunity, would be discouraged from being involved in the "judicial treatment of crime and misconduct").
93. Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1979) (en
banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943 (1980) (the judge would be required to testify on the issue of the private person's participation in the alleged conspiracy).

94. Id. The judge could not perform his official duties for the period of
time he was required to participate in the trial.

95. See note 41 supra.
96. 28 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1014 (1978) (the test of derivative immunity
should be whether the private person acted in good faith); see Hagopian v.
Consolidated Equities Corp., 397 F, Supp. 934 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (implying a
private defendant may be held liable for damages under § 1983 if he acted

pursuant to an improper motive).
97. The judge would still be required to testify and be subjected to dis-

covery if the private person is found to have acted in bad faith.
98. If there is a conspiracy between a state official and private persons
to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right, this satisfies the requirements to bring a suit under § 1983. The existence of a conspiracy does not
depend on the motives of a conspirator. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144 (1970).
99. E.g., French v. Corrigan, 432 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1970) (court dis-

missed suit brought against prosecutors and private defendants; since the
prosecutors were immune from suit, there was no action taken under color
of law).

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 14:89

state official should affect state action, certainly state action
should not depend on the good or bad faith of a private per00
son.'
Thus, it appears that a jurisdiction must either adhere to the
concept of derivative immunity or abandon it; there is no workable compromise. The major competing values are the necessary
redress of a plaintiff's constitutional deprivation' 0 1 versus the
discouragement of frivolous claims and the broadening of state
action. 10 2 It would seem that where a plaintiff has been deprived
of a constitutional right redressable under section 1983, his
because the state actor involved
claim should not be defeated
10 3
happens to be immune.
Curiously, a number of courts, particularly the Seventh Circuit, have managed to decide the derivative immunity issue
without even reaching it. 10 4 Rather than formulate a rule for or
against extending immunity to private persons, the cases are
dismissed for insufficient pleadings. 10 5 The theory and propriety of this policy is the focus of the next section.
PLEADING THE CONSPIRACY

Despite the conflict in the circuits on the application of derivative immunity, the courts appear to be in agreement on one
aspect of these cases. Whenever a plaintiff predicates a section
1983 suit on a prohibited conspiracy between judges' 0 6 and private persons, the courts will carefully scrutinize the sufficiency
100. If the presence of the judge in the suit is sufficient to establish state
action where the private person acts in bad faith, then it should be sufficient
where an act was performed in good faith. State action depends on the
state actor, not on the status of the private defendants.
101. The importance of providing the plaintiff with redress in a federal
court may be somewhat undermined by the fact that the plaintiff can still
bring a cause of action against the private defendants, for damages, in the
state court. See Bartlett v. Duty, 174 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ohio 1959).
102. See, e.g., Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d 976 (5th Cir.
1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943 (1980) (discussing the competing
policy considerations for and against derivative immunity).
103. See Robinson v. Bergstrom, 579 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1978) (dictum)
(immunity of the state actor should not preclude a finding of state action;
immunity is a defense and unrelated to the jurisdictional issue of whether
state action is present).
104. E.g., Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1979) (en banc)
(the court refused to adopt a rule for or against derivative immunity; instead, the court proposed a stringent pleading requirement).
105. See generally cases cited in note 140 infra.
106. Judges are dealt with in this comment because many of the conspiracy suits brought under § 1983 involve a judge as the state actor. However,
the rules which will be enunciated equally apply to any immune public official alleged to provide the requisite state action.
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of the pleadings. 10 7 This policy of "scrutinizing the pleadings" is
especially pronounced in civil rights actions. 0 8 The courts are
concerned that the plaintiff is trying to use the Civil Rights Act
as a vehicle to collaterally attack criminal convictions 0 9 or to
raise solely state law claims. 110
Since state law claims and purely private misconduct are
not remedied under section 1983,111 the federal courts must ascertain whether the allegations could support a finding of state
action. 1 2 To sufficiently meet the state action requirement, the
plaintiff must do more than merely state vague and conclusory
allegations. 113 It is unclear how much more would be required
in the way of pleading the cause of action.
Elements of the Cause of Action
There are two essential elements under section 1983 which a
plaintiff must allege in order to avoid a dismissal on the pleadings. First, the plaintiff must claim that there was a conspiracy
in which at least one participant involved acted under color of
107. See Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1979) (en banc)
(Swygert, Cummings & Wood JJ., dissenting) (the courts are requiring
more than the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with respect to the specificity of the allegations). But see Canty v. Brown, 383 F. Supp. 1396, 1399 (E.D.
Va. 1974), affd, 526 F.2d 587 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1062 (1976),
("[C]ivil rights complaints are to be broadly construed in order to effectuate the high congressional priority placed upon the vindication of civil
rights' deprivations.").
108. Jemzura v. Belden, 281 F. Supp. 200 (N.D.N.Y. 1968) (courts must
especially scrutinize the pleadings in civil rights complaints).
109. See Barnes v. Dorsey, 354 F. Supp. 179 (E.D. Mo. 1973) (civil rights
actions are inappropriate vehicles for collaterally attacking state criminal

convictions).
110. Jemzura v. Belden, 281 F. Supp. 200 (N.D.N.Y. 1968) (pleadings
should be scrutinized to be sure the plaintiff is not using the Civil Rights
Act solely to appeal state court judgments or to raise purely state law

claims).
111. Baer v. Baer, 450 F. Supp. 481,496 (N.D. Cal. 1978) ("[Tihe Constitution protects individuals from oppression by government, not private villainy. Accordingly, private conduct is left to state regulation. . . ."); Hill v.

Lewis, 361 F. Supp. 813 (E.D. Ark. 1973) (§ 1983 does not provide a federal
forum to redress private wrongs).
112. See, e.g., Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d 976 (5th Cir.
1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943 (1980) (amended complaint sufficient to support a finding of state action where it alleged a conspiracy involving a state actor in considerable detail).

113. Slotnick v. Stavisky, 560 F.2d 31 (1st Cir. 1977) (complaint will not
survive a motion to dismiss if it contains only vague, conclusory allegations
not supported by facts); Grow v. Fisher, 523 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1975) (same
principle); Kamsler v. Zaslawsky, 355 F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1966) (same principle); Powell v. Workmen's Compensation Bd., 327 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1964)
(same principle); Johnson v. Teasdale, 456 F. Supp. 1083 (W.D. Mo. 1978)

(same princple).
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state law. 114 Second, the plaintiff must allege that the conspiracy deprived him of a right, privilege or immunity secured by
the Constitution or the laws of the United States. 1 5 The majority of complaints result in dismissal for failure to sufficiently
plead the state action element. 116
In pleading the requisite state action element, the plaintiff
must do more than broadly claim the existence of a conspiracy." 7 The courts appear to have adopted a three step analysis
in determining the presence or absence of a conspiracy. In the
first step, the court determines whether the plaintiff has alleged
a "meeting of the minds" between the public official and the private persons."" At a minimum, the "meeting of the minds" requirement presumes a common understanding between the
20
parties," 9 or the performance of "joint and willful activity."'
Although there must be a willful participation in the conspiracy,
crimes resulting from the conspiracy need not be specifically intended.' 2 1 In civil actions, it is sufficient if there is a showing of
23
concerted action 122 or a civil partnership.
114. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (act in question must be taken under
color of any state statute, ordinance, regulation or custom); Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1959) (same principle).

115. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
116. The high dismissal rate for failure to sufficiently plead state action is
due, in part, to the principle of derivative immunity. Those states recognizing derivative immunity hold that there is no state action where the state
actor involved is immune from suit. See note 50 supra.
117. French v. Corrigan, 432 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1970) (it is not sufficient
that the plaintiff charge a conspiracy and recite verbatim the Civil Rights
Act); Dinwiddie v. Brown, 230 F.2d 465, 469 (5th Cir. 1956) ("merely characterizing [defendant's I conduct as conspiratorial does not set out allegations
upon which relief can be granted"); Bartlett v. Duty, 174 F. Supp. 94 (N.D.
Ohio 1959) (general charge of conspiracy is merely an unacceptable conclusory statement).
118. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (principle first enunciated).
119. E.g., Baer v. Baer, 450 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (a conspiracy
requires that there be a common understanding between the state actor
and the private defendants). But see Hoffman-LaRouche, Inc. v. Greenburg,
447 F.2d 872 (7th Cir. 1971) (it is not necessary that each conspirator know
the exact limitations of the unlawful venture).
120. Potenza v. Schoessling, 541 F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1976) (private persons
jointly engaged in prohibited action with a state officialare conspiring
under color of law); Bergman v. Stein, 404 F. Supp. 287 (S.D.N>Y. 1975) (it is
necessary to show that private persons and a state actor have Wi1lfuly participated in a conspiracy).
121. But cf. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (a specific intent
must be proved under 18 U.S.C. § 242, the criminal counterpart to § 1983).
122. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (§ 1983 conspiracy
involves concerted action between a state official and private defendants).
123. See Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1959) (comparing a
conspiracy with a civil partnership).
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The second step requires the plaintiff to allege that one or
more overt acts were committed by the defendants in furtherance of the conspiracy. 124 In alleging the commission of the
overt acts, the days and dates upon which the alleged acts took
place should be specified. 125 It should be noted that if the plaintiff alleges the commission of an act by one co-conspirator in a
particular district, that district may obtain jurisdiction over all
126
the conspirators.
The final step in the courts' analysis of the allegations is the
format of the pleadings themselves. 127 It is not sufficient that
the plaintiff avers a mere suspicion; 28 specificity of the conduct
is required such as "will permit an informed ruling whether the
wrong complained of is of federal cognizance."'129 This specificity requirement is relaxed somewhat where the plaintiff files a
pro se complaint.130 In pro se cases, the complainant does not
benefit from counsel and the court is more willing to construe
the pleadings liberally.' 3 ' Nevertheless, the majority of pro se
132
complaints result in a dismissal on the pleadings.
124. Dieu v. Norton, 411 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1969) (a complaint alleging a
conspiracy is insufficient without a showing of overt acts engaged in by the

defendants); Powell v. Workmen's Compensation Bd., 327 F.2d 131 (2d Cir.
1964) (same principle); Mandelkorn v. Patrick, 359 F. Supp. 692 (D.D.C.
1973) (same principle).
125. See Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975) (complaint
sufficient where it alleged days on which the defendants performed the prohibited acts). But see Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1959) (it is
not necessary to specify the dates upon which the alleged acts took place).
126. Mandelkorn v. Patrick, 359 F. Supp. 692 (D.D.C. 1973) (district
wherein one conspirator committed an overt act may obtain jurisdiction
over all conspirators provided they are properly served with process).
127. This step in the court's analysis deals with the form of the pleadings
as opposed to the substance of the pleadings. Even where a "meeting of the
minds" is alleged, coupled with the commission of overt acts, the court will
look to the specificity of the allegations.
128. E.g., Lee v. Alabama, 364 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 927 (1968), rehearing denied, 396 U.S. 871 (1969) (a complaint which
alleges a mere suspicion does not comply with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and therefore is insufficient).
129. Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270, 1275 (3d Cir. 1970); see also Dinwiddie v. Brown, 230 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1956) (court will not accept allegations
merely giving a state claim the guise of a civil rights action); Shakespeare v.
Wilson, 40 F.R.D. 500 (S.D. Cal. 1966) (requiring judicially cognizable statements).
130. See Clark v. Zimmerman, 394 F. Supp. 1166 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (informa
pauperis actions should be dismissed only if they are wholly frivolous or
malicious).
131. Haines v. Koerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (pro se complaints viewed less
stringently than pleadings drafted by attorneys); Stockheimer v. Underwood, 428 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Wis. 1977) (pro se complaints are to be liberally construed); Stambler v. Dillon, 302 F. Supp. 1250 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (same
principle with pro se amended complaints).
132. E.g., Stockheimer v. Underwood, 428 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Wis. 1977)
(pro se complaint dismissed); Stambler v. Dillon, 302 F. Supp. 1250
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Defeating the Motion to Dismiss
The high dismissal rate of civil rights complaints is attributable to a failure to comply with the court's interpretation of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure13 3 and a failure to plead with
specificity. 3 4 In addition to the general allegations of conspiracy, purpose, and color of law, the plaintiff must set forth particularized averments. The plaintiff should allege "particularly
what the defendants did to carry the conspiracy into effect,
whether such acts fit within the framework of the conspiracy alleged, and whether such acts, in the ordinary course of events,
13 5
would proximately cause injury to the plaintiff."'
Almost invariably, the defendants respond to the conspiracy
allegations with a motion to dismiss. 136 Where a motion to
dimiss is made, the courts will assume that the material allegations of the complaint are true 137 and will construe the allegations most favorably to the pleader. 13 8 Despite these
concessions, plaintiffs' complaints do not ordinarily survive the
motion to dismiss. In the Seventh Circuit, for example, the appellate court has never had to adopt a per se rule for or against
derivative immunity. 3 9 This is because no complaint in the
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (dismissal of amended complaints); Shakespeare v. Wilson,
40 F.R.D. 500 (S.D. Cal. 1966) (dismissal of twice amended complaint).
133. Lee v. Alabama, 364 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 927
(1968), rehearing denied, 396 U.S. 871 (1969) (complaint dismissed for failure to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Burton v. Peartree, 326 F. Supp. 755 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (same).
134. Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1979) (en bane) (case
dismissed because the pleadings lacked specificity); French v. Corrigan, 432
F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1970) (same); Bartlett v. Duty, 174 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ohio
1959) (same).
135. Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280, 295 (9th Cir. 1959) (emphasis added); Martin Hodas, East Coast Cinematics, Inc. v. Lindsay, 431 F. Supp. 637
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (same principle).
136. Complaints are most frequently met with a motion to dismiss in jurisdictions which adhere to derivative immunity. If the state actor involved
is immune from suit, the motion is likely to be granted without regard to the
sufficiency of the complaint. See, e.g., Sykes v. California, 497 F.2d 197 (9th

Cir. 1974).
137. Fine v. City of New York, 529 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1975) (court assumes
allegations set forth in the complaint are true in ruling on a motion to dismiss); Canty v. Brown, 383 F. Supp. 1396 (E.D. Va. 1974), affd, 526 F.2d 587
(4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1062 (1976) (same principle); see
Stockheimer v. Underwood, 428 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Wis. 1977) (court need
only accept well-pleaded facts as true).
138. Lessman v. McCormick, 591 F.2d 605 (10th Cir. 1979) (pleadings are
construed most favorably to the pleader). But see Baer v. Baer, 450 F. Supp.
481 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (the court will not consider points which were not
raised in the pleadings when reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings).
139. Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d 261, 265 (7th Cir. 1979) (en banc)
("The Seventh Circuit has in the past often avoided establishing ... a per
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Seventh Circuit, alleging a prohibited conspiracy, has survived a
140
motion to dismiss.
Recently, in Sparkman v. McFarlin,141 the plaintiff brought
suit under section 1983 alleging that she was deprived of due
process and equal protection of the law when she was ordered to
be sterilized without her knowledge or consent. 142 The sterilization order was issued in an ex parte proceeding and was never
filed in the court. 143 The plaintiff was unaware of the consequences of the surgery, having been informed she was merely
having her appendix removed. 144
Courts have consistently held that sterilizations performed
under similar circumstances are unconstitutional. 45 One case
even refused to allow the judge who ordered the sterilization to
benefit from judicial immunity. 14 The Sparkman court, howse rule that no claim can ever be stated against private parties alleged to
have conspired with immune judicial officials . .
").
140. Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1979) (en bane) (complaint dismissed for insufficient pleadings); Grow v. Fisher, 523 F.2d 875 (7th
Cir. 1975) (same); Hansen v. Ahlgrimm, 520 F.2d 768 (7th Cir. 1975) (same);
French v. Corrigan, 432 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 915
(1971) (same); Dieu v. Norton, 411 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1969) (same); Kamsler
v. Zaslawsky, 355 F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1966) (same); Davis v. Foreman, 251 F.2d
421 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 974 (1958) (same).
141. 601 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1979) (en banc). Sparkman had an interesting
procedural history. The plaintiff brought an action, pursuant to § 1983,
against the judge who ordered her sterilized, the attorneys who drafted the
petition for sterilization, the doctors who performed the sterilization, her
mother, and the hospital where the operation was performed. The district
court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the only state actor
joined as a defendant was immune from suit. The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and therefore the judge was not protected by judicial immunity. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the appellate court decision, holding that the judge was immune from suit. The Court declined to
consider whether the judge's immunity precluded suit against the private
defendants.
On remand, the appellate court dismissed the case for insufficient
pleadings of any conspiracy between the judge and the private defendants.
Sparkman was subsequently heard by the Seventh Circuit en banc. A per
curiam order was filed which affirmed the appellate court decision. Four
separate concurring opinions were submitted which seemed to indicate a
willingness to hold private persons liable if they conspire with an immune
state official. The judges held that in Sparkman, however, the pleadings
were insufficient to allege the conspiracy.
142. Id.
143. Id. The plaintiff received no notice of the hearing in which the judge
signed the sterilization order.
144. Id.
145. Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910
(1978) (dictum) (sterilization of the plaintiff, without her informed consent,
violated her constitutional rights); Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1975)
(same principle); Wade v. Bethesda Hosp., 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971)
(same principle).
146. Wade v. Bethesda Hosp., 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971) (judge
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ever, found it unnecessary to reach the constitutional issue. The
147
court simply dismissed the case due to insufficient pleadings.
The plaintiff was not afforded an opportunity to amend the complaint or proceed with further discovery 148 despite Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 15(a),1 49 by which leave to amend complaints
should be "freely given in the interests of justice." 150 It cannot
be maintained that Sparkman is an aberration. When courts determine that complaints alleging a conspiracy are insufficient,
the trend is to dismiss the complaints rather than to grant leave
5
to amend.' '
The policy of dismissing complaints which lack particularized pleadings is predicated on the concern that federal courts
would otherwise be set up "as an arbiter of the correctness of
every state [court] decision."' 5 2 While this is a valid consideration, requiring particularized pleadings to avoid dismissal 5 3 has
not been viewed favorably by the Supreme Court. In Conley v.
Gibson, 5 4 for example, the Court held that "a complaint should
not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set offacts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."' 55 Subsequent court decisions have consistently adhered to the Conley
156
holding.
who ordered the plaintiff sterilized acted in excess of his jurisdiction and
was not entitled to judicial immunity).
147. Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1979) (en banc).

148. Id. It was apparently established that the plaintiff would be unable
to furnish additional relevant facts.
149. FED. R. Civ. P. 15 (a) provides that, after a responsive pleading has
been served, "a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by
written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires."

150. Id. See Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied,434 U.S. 975 (1977) (leave to amend shall be freely given).
151. E.g., Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1979),(en banc)
(dissenting opinion and cases cited therein). A test proposed for whether
or not leave to amend the complaint should be granted is "whether ... allegations of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could cure the
deficiency in the complaint." Asher v. Harrington, 461 F.2d 890, 895 (7th Cir.
1972).
152. Johnson v. Stone, 268 F.2d 803, 804 (7th Cir. 1959) (quoting Bottone v.
Lindsley, 170 F.2d 705, 707 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 944 (1949)).

153. In Sparkman, the court's response to the derivative immunity question was to avoid adopting a strict rule for or against derivative immunity.
Instead, the court indicated that particularized pleadings would be required
in order to survive a motion to dismiss. Apparently, if the pleadings are
deemed sufficient, the plaintiff could have a cause of action against private

persons who conspire with immune judges.
154. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
155. Id. at 45-46 (emphasis added).
156. [This case] reminds us of the need for periodic exercise, for over
and over and over again-but apparently not often enough-this court
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Derivative Immunity

Requiring particularized pleadings is not only inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's ruling that motions to dismiss should
be granted sparingly, it is in derogation of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a) (2) requires only that the plaintiff
present a "short and plain statement of the claim."'1 57 This pro158
vision has been interpreted as a form of "notice pleading."'
With respect to notice pleading, it is sufficient if the plaintiff sets
forth a claim and provides the defendants with fair notice of the
basis of the claim. 159 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(f) similarly proposes a lenient consideration of complaints, providing
that "all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial jus160
tice."
While the courts have not ignored Federal Rule 8, the Rule
is typically invoked to justify dismissing a complaint. Generally, the reason for dismissal is the plaintiff's failure to state his
claim succinctly, briefly, and clearly. 16' The courts do not look
favorably upon lengthy and rambling complaints. 162 Undeniably, certain lengthy and conclusory complaints warrant a summary dismissal. It is unlikely, however, that Rule 8 was
designed solely to provide the courts with justification for dismissing cases. Rule 8 should also provide a basis for approving
complaints without requiring a particularized fact to support
has stated, explained, reiterated, stressed, rephrased, and emphasized
one simple, long-established, well-publicized rule of Federal practice: a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to
recover under any state of facts which could be proved in support of his
claim.
Cook & Nichol, Inc. v. Plimsoll Club, 451 F.2d 505, 506 (5th Cir. 1971); see also
Haines v. Koerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (same principle); Slavin v. Curry, 574
F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), modified, 583 F.2d 779 (5th Cir. 1978) (same principle); Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 975 (1977) (same principle).
157. FED. R. Cirv. P. 8(a) (2) provides that "[a] pleading which sets forth a
claim for relief shall contain. . . a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief...."
158. E.g., Sundstrand Corp. v. Standard Kollsman Indus., Inc., 488 F.2d
807 (7th Cir. 1973) (notice pleading is sufficient under the Federal Rules).
159. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) (the purpose of Federal Rule 8 is
fulfilled where the defendant is provided with adequate notice of the basis
of plaintiffs claim); Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1979) (en
banc) (Swygert, Cummings, & Wood, JJ. dissenting) (same principle).
160. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(f).
161. Lowery v. Hauk, 422 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (verbose and redundant complaints may be dismissed without leave to amend); Shakespeare v. Wilson, 40 F.R.D. 500 (S.D. Cal. 1966) (complaint dismissed for lack
of brevity and clarity in the pleadings).
162. E.g., Burton v. Peartree, 326 F. Supp. 755 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (lengthy
and rambling complaints violate Federal Rule 8, which requires a short and
plain statement of the claim).
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every element of the allegation. 163 Complaints should be construed especially liberally in conspiracy cases since "joint activity" between defendants is particularly difficult to both plead
and prove. 6 4 Further, there is a distinction between surviving a
motion to dismiss and prevailing on the merits. 165 Uncertainty
with respect to the plaintiff's success at trial should not preclude
166
granting the plaintiff an opportunity to present his claim.
CONCLUSION

In order to successfully allege a section 1983 cause of action
on the grounds of a prohibited conspiracy, the plaintiff must al167
lege that at least one defendant acted under color of state law.
Where the state actor involved is immune from suit, however, a
plaintiff's likelihood of successfully maintaining a cause of action is minimal in jurisdictions which recognize derivative immunity. Jurisdictions which have adopted derivative immunity
will dismiss the complaint since the private persons vicariously
benefit from the public official's immunity.168
163. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) (while pleadings could benefit from particularization, that is not sufficient cause to dismiss the claim
on the pleadings); Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975) (same

pinciple); Harman v. Valley Nat'l Bank of Ariz., 339 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir.
196p4) ("The mere fact that some of the allegations in the complaint are lack-

ing in detail is not a proper ground for dismissal."). But see Lee v. Alabama,
364 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 927 (1968), rehearing denied, 396 U.S. 871 (1969) (implying that allegations of conspiracy must comply with Federal Rule 9(b) which requires particularized pleadings); Hill v.
Lewis, 361 F. Supp. 813 (E.D. Ark. 1973) (same by implication).
164. See Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1979) (en banc)
(Swygert, Cummings & Wood, JJ. dissenting) (conspiracies are generally
clandestine, and it is difficult to provide direct evidence of an agreement
between the defendants).
165. See, e.g., Cook &Nichol, Inc. v. Plimsoll Club, 451 F.2d 505, 510-11 (5th
Cir. 1971) (referring to the plaintiff's allegations, the court stated that
"[wihether this is all steam, or whether there is some substance depends
on the proof offered .

.

. [at trial] ....

[A]ll we have determined .

.

. is

that the complaint states a claim ... and cannot therefore be disposed of
on the pleadings."); Webb v. Standard Oil Co., 414 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1969)
(the complaint stated a claim and could not therefore be disposed of on the
pleadings, although the court implied that plaintiffs chances of success at
trial were minimal).
166. Id. But cf. Clark v. Zimmerman, 394 F. Supp. 1166 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (if
the plaintiff's complaint is totally frivolous, or he has no chance of success
at trial, then the motion to dismiss should be granted).
167. E.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (state action is a
requirement of a federal civil rights claim). In addition to state action, the
plaintiff must allege that the act in question deprived him of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
168. The theory of derivative immunity is that the private persons have
not conspired with anyone against whom a valid claim can be stated.
Therefore, state action is lacking and the complaint must be dismissed with
respect to the private persons as well. See note 38 supra.

1980]

Derivative Immunity

The policy of extending immunity to private persons fulfills
the important objective of restricting access to the federal courts
and the review of state court decisions. 169 Nevertheless, to the
extent that derivative immunity leaves valid federal claims unredressed, the principle is questionable. "Whatever factors of
policy and fairness militate in favor of extending some immunity to private parties acting in concert with state officials,
[those factors] were resolved by Congress in favor of those who
170
claim a deprivation of constitutional rights.'
Even in jurisdictions where derivative immunity is not adhered to, attorneys will have a difficult time alleging a section
1983 cause of action. Surviving a motion to dismiss will be the
most formidable obstacle. Despite the caveat that "technical
pleading requirements [should not] defeat the vindication of
. . . constitutional rights,"' 7 1 the courts seem to be requiring an
extremely particularized pleading of the conspiracy. 172 This
particularized pleading requirement is in derogation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 73 and the judicial principle that
74
motions to dismiss should be granted sparingly.
The particularized pleading barrier is especially difficult to
overcome since pleading and proving a section 1983 conspiracy
is not an easy task. Additionally, the courts have failed to set
forth criteria indicative of a sufficient pleading. 7 5 Regardless of
169. Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1979) (en bane)
(Swygert, Cummings, & Wood, JJ., dissenting) (discussing the policy considerations for and against derivative immunity).
170. Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 910 (1978).
171. Canty v. Brown, 383 F. Supp. 1396, 1400 (E.D. Va. 1974), afd, 526 F.2d
587 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1062 (1976).
172. E.g., Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1979) (en bane)
(rather than adopt a rule for or against derivative immunity, the court will
require a claim to be accompanied by particularized pleadings). But cf.
Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943 (1980) (abandoning derivative immunity and suggesting a relaxation of the pleading requirements).
173. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (2) (requiring only a short and plain statement of
the claim).
174. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) (motion to dismiss should be
granted only when there is no set of facts upon which the plaintiff would be
entitled to relief); Haggy v. Solem, 547 F.2d 1363 (8th Cir. 1977) (same principle)
175. E.g., Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1979) (en banc)
(affirming the appellate court decision holding that the pleadings were insufficient, without setting forth reasons for the decision). But see Sparks v.
Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 943 (1980). In Sparks the court set forth certain factors which a
sufficient pleading requires, and held that the complaint in question was
sufficient. However, Sparks involved an easy situation wherein the judge
clearly accepted a bribe for which he rendered a decision in favor of the
defendants. Most cases are not this clear-cut, as conspiracies generally do
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the merits of the this approach, however, it certainly cannot be
ignored. The proper recourse for plaintiffs' attorneys is to particularly set forth all allegations relevant to the issue, and to
emphasize the policy considerations militating in the plaintiff's
favor. 176 Perhaps the courts will recognize that derivative immunity and particularized pleading requirements result in more
than just the discouragement of frivolous civil rights claims.
The vindication of valid civil rights claims is defeated as well.
Jacquelyn F. Kidder

not involve direct evidence of a "meeting of the minds." Where there is
only circumstantial evidence of the conspiracy, the courts look upon the
pleadings less leniently.
176. See notes 77-80 and accompanying text supra.

